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BOWA-3639

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

Attn: ☐ ☐
Chief of Base, Bonn

JAN 20 1954

Operational/LIAISON

Conversation with Dr. GLOMER

Ho. Glatter

Attached is Memo for the Record detailing a conversation with
Staatssekretar GLOMER on 18 January 1954. Item 4 will be reported
separately to FCB.

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Enclosure:

Memo for the Record (dup)

20 January 1954

Distribution:

3 - COM, w/encl in dup

3 - HQ, " " " " ✓

1 - O.B./D ☐, w/encl in single copy

7 ENCL.

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
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19 January 1954

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Staatssekretär Globke, 18 January 1954

1. Meeting was held in the Schaumburg Palais at 1930 hours on 18 January 1954. [] and [] represented KUBARK.

2. The Kogon Affair. At the last meeting on 14 December 1953, Dr. Globke had pointed out the interest of the Bundeskanzleramt in the Kogon affair and noted he had been informed that Kogon was about to be prosecuted by HICOG. The Chancellor was concerned that no harm should come to the European Union Movement and requested clarification of HICOG's relations with Kogon. During the week of 21 December 1953, a letter was left at Dr. Globke's office outlining Kogon's non-fulfillment of contract vis-a-vis HICOG to the extent of DM 286,000. Dr. Globke acknowledged receipt of this report and expressed his appreciation for the information it contained. He then went on to point out that investigation had established that Kogon's debts involved DM 70,000 to the European Union and DM 100,000 to various commercial creditors over and above his obligations to HICOG. Globke stated that a group of German industrialists would make up the DM 70,000 deficit in the Europa Union funds but that Kogon himself must settle his obligations with other creditors, including HICOG.

We pointed out that HICOG officials had no choice except to press for the recovery of the money from Kogon or they would be derelict in their duty. Globke acknowledged this necessity and asked only that an attempt to recover the funds involve a civil suit and not a criminal charge of fraud. He stated that Kogon had been removed from his Europa Union offices and replaced by a committee headed by the journalist Dr. Friedlander. He estimated that time would erase the connection in people's mind between Kogon and the European Movement.

Globke was informed that a letter would be sent to Kogon demanding the fulfillment of his contracts or HICOG would have recourse to legal processes. We pointed out that these were normal steps to be taken and the interjection of overriding political considerations would require intervention on the level of Chancellor Adenauer raising the matter with Ambassador Conant. Globke stated that the Chancellor would not wish to adopt this course. The Germans would see that the discrepancy directly connected with the Europa Union would be covered but would not claim that great political considerations were involved in Kogon's transactions that were not directly connected with his functions for Europa Union. Kogon had demonstrated his irresponsibility and it would not be wise to completely cover up this fact and allow him to play any major role in the future.

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(On 19 January 1954 [] informed D/Hicomer Dowling, Dwight Porter of Administration and Hoofnagle of Public Affairs of the position taken by the Chancellor's office. Public Affairs had been waiting to receive this position statement. They will now dispatch their letter to Kogon.)

3. Anti-Western Propaganda. We pointed out to Dr. Globke that it was anticipated that the Soviets and the East German Government would continue their denunciation of Western espionage and sabotage and possibly make an issue of this subject at the forthcoming four-power conference. We pointed out that General Timberman had issued a statement and that Public Affairs had given guidance to its branches along the line that the Soviets were trying to hide the local patriotism and the disgust of East Germans with their illegitimate regime by claiming that 17 June and similar disorders were the result of West German and Western machinations. We pointed out the main themes of a brief that had been sent by cable note from Frankfurt and inquired if it were the intention of the Federal Republic to answer these attacks or anticipate new ones by having such themes key-noted in a major speech by the Chancellor or the Kaiser Ministry. Globke was not certain of intentions along this line but called Staatssekretär Thedieck on the telephone and suggested our theme and asked for his plans. We learned that the German Government had been collecting all available material on Eastern espionage, Menschenraub, etc., and were planting many articles in West German newspapers. They intended to increase this activity in this period immediately before the four-power conference but did not propose to have any one specific theme enunciated by a leading German figure. (We were forced to leave the subject there. Globke is not a technical expert in the propaganda field and discussions of specific programs such as this would probably be more rewarding if held directly with Thedieck.)

4. Gehlen Organisation. Since Gehlen's name had come up in the context of the previous paragraph we inquired as to the status of integration of the Gehlen Organisation. We stated that it was our understanding that there was considerable current discussion as to the specific manner of integration; we wished to reiterate to Dr. Globke that the American position was still the same as outlined on previous occasions, namely that, for the best interests of all concerned, it was thought that a broad range essentially civilian intelligence agency was advisable and we had no interest in supporting a narrowly military G-2 within the Defense Ministry. Dr. Globke stated that the Chancellor's office held exactly the same opinion, as it had also concurred in 1950. He pointed out, however, that there were of course certain difficulties. One of the difficulties was that the Foreign Office was interested in an intelligence organization under its own wing and that Dr. Josef Loens (Abteilung I, Personal Verwaltung) was an empire builder in this respect. The political opposition (SPD) also had no interest in strengthening the Chancellor's office. With regard to the other personalities involved, Dr. Globke stated that Theodor Blank accepted the solution of integration into the Chancellor's office and that in the near future Globke hoped to come to

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agreement with Fritz Erler (SPD). In his opinion Josef Strauss was not an opponent of the Chancellor's office and its power but rather a personal opponent of the Gehlen Organisation.

5. Bank Deutscher Laender. We recalled to Dr. Globke the difficulties we had encountered in obtaining release of the funds for the [] house. He was familiar with the background of the case. We told him that Dr. Albrecht of the Bank Deutscher Laender in Frankfurt would release the funds to our representative if he received instructions from the Bundeskanzleramt. We handed Dr. Globke a draft memo which we requested him to send to the BDL. Dr. Globke pointed out that the Bundeskanzleramt was not the competent office to issue instructions to the BDL. He was willing, however, to change the wording of the memo and, rather than instructing the BDL to carry out the transaction, he would inform it that the Bundeskanzleramt had no objections to the proposed transfer of funds. It is estimated that such notification for the personal file of Albrecht will suffice. (We will recheck with Dr. Globke's secretary to see if this information was passed orally or if a memo was sent to the BDL.)

6. Expulsion. The American interest in expulsion of non-German nationals was pointed out to Dr. Globke. We explained to him that we had discussed this matter with Ritter von Lax pointing out the danger to the policy of asylum in the West and the danger of disclosure of Western occupation or German security interests. Although expulsion is within the power of the Land we wish to request that all expulsions be made a matter of record at the federal level where Allied liaison could represent our interests. Dr. Globke appreciated our viewpoint and gave the opinion that the desired solution was possible. We left with him a memo on the subject and informed him that the matter would probably be brought up with him officially by one of the Deputy High Commissioners representing the wishes of the Allied Directors of Intelligence. He agreed that Ritter von Lax should be given this memo in the meantime on an informal basis to see what practical steps could be taken toward a solution.

7. Internationale Presse Agentur (IPA). As a last point, on the instructions of [] , we reverted to an item brought up in the meeting 23 November 1953. At that time we had suggested that some agency of the German Government might at an appropriate time take over the Internationale Presse Agentur (IPA) and the Deutsche Freiheitsliege. In the meantime our own closer examination had revealed that these agencies were not particularly valuable and we ourselves had severed connection with them. Dr. Globke had himself apparently forgotten the matter and the names of the units involved so we mutually agreed to merely forget about the matter.

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